In the classical inventory models called the Economie Order Quantity (EOQ) models, a crucial assumption made is that the demand rate for a product is constant and that it is independent of the level of the inventory of the product. The demand rate in these models is exogenous to the model and is unaffected by the décision variable -the order (or production) quantity of the product. Such an assumption is plausible in a monopoly situation where the demand for the product can only be satisfied at a single vendor or in cases where the vendor has a contract to supply the product at a fixed rate. However, in a non-monopoly situation, such an assumption may not be valid. This probably is the reason for the failure of the classical models to explain the large inventories held by automobile dealers, liquor stores, etc, all of which exist in a very compétitive environment. For exampîe, the demand for cars at an automobile dealer may depend on how many cars the dealer has at his dealership (physically) relative to the number of cars held by other competing automobile dealers. Assuming that the other factors that affect demand rate such as price, location of dealership, advertising, etc, are the same, a dealer with a larger inventory of cars than his competitors is likely to sell proportionately more cars than his competitors simply because of his larger inventory. Other examples of products where the demand for the product is affected by the inventory level of the product are alcoholic beverages, electrical appliances, télévisions, computers, stereo equipment, etc, all of which are sold usually in a compétitive environment by several vendors.
One reason for this phenomenon is that the vendor with the larger inventory can stock the product with more combinations of attributes. For example, a car dealer with a larger inventory can have more cars with different combinations of attributes such as color, combination of options, type (sedan, coupe, station wagon, etc.), manufacturer, etc. A consumer who wishes to buy a car with a spécifie combination of attributes (color, options, etc.) is more likely to find such a car at a dealer who has a larger inventory than others. Hence, such a consumer is more likely to buy from that dealer than from any other dealers. Even a consumer who is undecided about what attributes (s)he wants will have more choices at a dealer with more cars and for that reason is more likely to buy from that dealer.
In this paper, we will assume that the demand for a product is directly proportional to the inventory level of the product relative to the total inventory of the product held by all competing vendors. We do not imply by this assumption that inventory créâtes demand. Instead we simply assume that inventory affects the distribution of the total demand. The total demand for the product at all vendors will be assumed to be fixed. The question that arises is what is the optimal order/production quantity for a vendor who is trying to maximize his market share and minimize his annual ordering cost and his annual holding cost. We will examine this question for two different replenishment policies: base stock policy where the vendors keep a constant level of inventory by ordering the product at the same rate as the demand; and continuous review policy where all the vendors replenish their inventory when the inventory level drops to a predetermined level. We will analyze this question assuming no coopération between the vendors. In the next section we give a brief description of the classical EOQ model to compare our results with later. Then in section 3 the case of fixed inventory level (base stock policy) is analyzed. Finally, section 4 consists of the analysis of the case of continuous review policy. The proofs of all the theorems are stated in the appendix.
IL THE CLASSICAL EOQ MODEL
The classical EOQ model détermines the optimal order quantity that minimizes the sum of the annual ordering costs and the annual holding costs. The main assumptions of this model are as follows.
A,l. The demand for the product is constant and independent of the quantity ordered.
A. 2. Shortages cannot be backordered. A. 3. Replenishment of inventory takes place instantaneously when order is received.
A.4. The lead time for receiving an order is deterministic and exactly known.
Under these assumptions, the optimal policy is to order the quantity Q where While assumptions A. 2 to A. 4 are easily relaxed, assumption A. 1 is not so easy to drop. The case of nonsteady demand but still independent of the quantity ordered is dealt with using dynamic programming [see e. g., Wagner and Whitin (1958) ]. The case of the demand being dependent on the inventory level has been examined only by Case (1979) . Case limits his analysis to finding the optimal response if everyone else's inventory level is known. Our analysis and methods are different and we focus on the more genera! problem of finding an optimal policy for each vendor assuming only that the other vendors are rational décision makers.
UI. THE BASE STOCK POLICY MODEL
In this model, there are n traders selling simiiar products at comparable priées. Furthermore, we assume that all factors (other than the inventory level) that détermine the demand are the same at all vendors. In this particular model, we consider situations where all vendors maintain a fixed level of inventory by ordering the product at the same rate as the realized demand. This is typical in situations where the fixed ordering cost is insignificant relative to the holding cost.
Let N={1,2, ...,n} represent the set of n traders labeled by the first n natural numbers. The main assumptions of this model are as follows. B. 5 ïnventory is replenished continuously with rate of replenishment equal to rate of demand.
Assumption B. 5 is applicable in cases where the ordering cost C o is small in comparison to the unit holding cost C h for each vendor. Assumption B. 5 implies that the inventory level of each vendor will be fixed with respect to time. In practice though, this will be impossible to achieve exactly. There will be minor fluctuations in the inventory level. However, if the inventory level is large, the small fluctuations in the inventory level will not affect the results very much. The décision variable for each vendor i will be the fixed level of inventory, denoted by Q h to maintain. By assumption B. 1 and B. 2, it follows that demand at vendor i will be at a rate independent of t given by
where R t dénotes the annual demand at vendor z, and Q dénotes the total n inventory at all vendors, i. e., Q = £ Q jt Throughout this paper we will assume that the total inventory at all vendors is strictly positive. Let C hi dénote vendor f s cost of holding one unit of the product in inventory for one year. This parameter will typically include interest expense, storage cost, insurance, dépréciation, absolescence, theft, breakage and spoilage, etc. In gênerai, ail variable costs associated with holding inventory are included in C h t . Since we assume that the items are continuously replenished, this would require that an order be placed for each unit sold. Hence, in this case, the ordering cost will also be included in C h f . Let Pi dénote the profit per unit realized by vendor i bef ore taking into vol. 21, n° 1, février 1987 account the holding cost. Then vendor i's payoff function is his annual net profit given as follows:
Throughout the paper, we will assume that for ail /, C h t >0 and P t >0, Note that we have a n-person non-zero-sum game where the players are the vendors, the décision variable for each vendor i is the fixed level of inventory Q L to maintain and the payoff function for each vendor i is FI £ which dépends on the actions of all the vendors. The data required for the model are C K { and P t for ail i, and R.
The question that arises is what level of inventory should vendor i maintain assuming that he is interested in maximizing his annual net profit as given above in expression (3.2) . This of course dépends on the actions (inventory levels) of the other vendors. First, we will answer this question assuming that vendor i can observe the inventory levels of all the other vendors and that the other vendors will not change their levels as a resuit of vendor f s actions. Of course, the latter assumption is not very realistic. However, after we complete this analysis, we will drop this unrealistic assumption and answer the more gênerai question of what vendor i should do assuming only that the other vendors are, like himself, only trying to maximize their respective annual net profit.
We will start by Computing an upper bound on the inventory level that vendor / will ever carry assuming that the inventory holding costs should be no more than the contribution from sales. The most demand that vendor i could achieve is to corner the entire market, i. e., R, Hence, denoting the upper bound by g iimax , we have C Ki Q t màx = P t R, Le.,
ôi, max represents the inventory level such that if vendor i held more inventory than this level (for whatever reasons), then he would realize a loss for certain. The parameter a t represents the smallest frequency of demand necessary for vendor i to offset his cost of keeping one unit in inventory for one year. Second, if vendor i limits his objective to short term profit maximizing, then he should not carry any inventory if his competitors are carrying "too much" inventory, Le., more than Q imax . This is because the cost of maintaining any level of inventory will exceed the contribution f rom sales generated ö P. P. SHENOY by the same inventory. Note that what is "too much" for vendor i need not be "too much" for the other vendors particularly if their cost efficiency factor OC; is smaller than that of vendor i. Vendors with relatively small values of o,-have a compétitive advantage in this respect. Another way to view this result is that if vendor i has the resources to absorb short term losses and furthermore perceives his competitors to be short term profit maximizers, then one possible strategy to eliminate his compétition is to carry a large inventory long enough to cause his competitors to stop carrying the product. This strategy is particularly effective for those vendors who have cost advantage (relatively small values of a,) relative to other vendors. However, this strategy is a double-edged sword because if the other vendors décide to respond to this strategy by also carrying large inventories, then everyone loses in this situation.
Finally, if vendor i limits his actions to optimal responses, then the maximum inventory he will ever carry is Q i>mSi J4 and furthermore, this maximum is achieved when the competitors are also carrying (in total) the same amount, i. e., Qi max /4. Therefore, when vendor f s competitors inventories Q t is in the range (0, Q, max /4], an optimal response by vendor i to an increase in inventory by the competitors is to increase his own inventory. However, when Q t is in the range [Qj ifnax /4, ôi )inax ], tnen tne optimal response to an increase in inventory by the other vendors is for vendor i to decrease his own inventory.
We will illustrate these results by an example.
Example 3.1: Consider two automobile dealers selling similar cars at comparable priées. Suppose that the total annual demand is 1,000 cars. Suppose that for vendor 1, the annual unit holding cost (in dollars) is 1,000, and that his unit profit before holding costs is 1,000, For vendor 2, let the annual unit holding cost be 1,000 and the unit profit before holding costs be 900. For vendor 1, a x = l per year whereas for vendor 2, oc 2 = l. 11 per year., This means that for every car that vendor 1 holds in stock for a year, he has to realize a frequency of demand equal to 1 per year to offset his holding costs whereas for vendor 2 the corresponding parameter is 1.11 per year. Clearly, vendor 1 is more cost efficient than vendor 2. Suppose that both vendors have a constant inventory level of 100 cars. Then they split the demand equality and the resulting net annual profits are respectively $ 400,000 and $ 350,000. Suppose that vendor 1 décides to respond optimally to vendor 2's inventory level (assuming of course that vendor 2 would not subsequently change his inventory level). Then as indicated by Theorem 3.1, vendor 1 increases his inventory to 216 cars. Subsequently, his share of the demand increases to 684 cars whereas vendor 2's demand decreases to 316 cars. The resulting net annual profits are respectively $648,000 and $184,000. If contrary to vendor I's expectation, vendor 2 décides to also change his stock level so as to be at an optimal level corresponding to vendor I's new stock level, then he will increase his inventory level to 225 cars and the resulting net annual profits are $274,000 and $234,000 respectively for vendor 1 and 2. If this process of sequential optimization continues, the results are shown in table 3.1. In this example, sequential optimization eventually leads to the inventory levels such that neither vendor has any incentive to change his level unilaterally since either increasing or decreasing the stock level leads to a decrease in that vendons profit. We call such a situation a "Nash Equilibrium" (NE). More formally, we say that (ô*, ö*> -• ->ô*) is a Nash Equilibrium if for each vendor z, i= 1, . . ., n, Qf is an optimal solution to the problem:
subject to: 0,^0.
In the example above, at the Nash Equilibrium, both dealers are worse off than they were at the beginning when they both maintained an inventory level of 100 cars. In this respect, the inventory game resembles the classical prisoners' dilemma game: the Nash Equilibrium payoffs are not pareto optimal [see Luce and Raiffa (1957) for a discussion of the prisoners' dilemma game].
Suppose that the n vendors are labeled in increasing order of cost inefficiency, i. e., a 1^o t 2^ . . . ga rt . Then the NE inventory levels are given by Theorem 3.2 below. where Q*= and First we will comment on the condition on the cost inefficiency parameters. If the number of vendors is just 2, then the condition reduces to oc 2 = ot 1 +a 2 which is always true. As the number of vendors increases, the condition becomes more and more stringent requiring in the limit as n -> oo that ail vendors have the same value for the cost inefficiency factor a,-. Essentially, this condition rules out the existence of vendors who are relatively "too inefficient." Note that the condition can be rewritten as
Next we remark about the nature of the Nash Equilibrium. In expression -> more cost efficient vendors carry more stock than less cost efficient vendors. Also note that the total inventory is directly proportional to the total demand, and inversely proportional to the total cost inefficiency factor of all the vendors. If all the vendors have the same cost inefficiency factor a,-, then we can write Q* = R(n-l)/na,-. Hence the total inventory at all vendors is an increasing function of the number of vendors bounded from above by R/OLJ -QJ max . This last observation implies that as the number of vendors increases, the total profit that is made by all vendors decreases. In the case of 2 vendors (with the same parameters a,-and Pj), the total inventory cost of the two vendors is equal to half the total market potential P t R leaving each vendor with a profit of 1/4 of the total market potential. In the case of 3 vendors, the corresponding total inventory cost is (2/3) PiR leaving each vendor with a profit of (1/9) P t R and so on. This fact acts as a natural barrier to the entry of new vendors when there are already some established vendors in the market. Also, this explains the high inventories observed in a compétitive market that cannot be accounted for by classical EOQ models.
The Nash equilibrium inventory levels is a normative solution concept. If vendor i is rational, i. e., prefers more profit to less, and assumes that ail othcr vendors arc also rational, then the level of inventory hc should carry is as prescribed by the Nash Equilibrium. If all the other vendors also do likewise, then the Nash Equilibrium is attained and each vendor makes a profit given as in (3.6). If some vendor does not carry inventory as prescribed by the Nash Equilibrium but the others do, then this vendor makes less profit than he would have if he had carried inventory as per the NE. This is a compelling reason to follow the NE prescription.
Ail of the foregoing discussion assumes no coopération between the vendors. If the vendors do cooperate and can make binding agreements to carry a uniformly lower level of inventory, then all vendors can do better than they would have if they had followcd the NE prescription. This is typical of prisoners' dilemma type of situations.
If there do exist vendors who are "too inefficient" then the NE inventory levels are described in theorem 3.3 below. 
IV. THE CONTINUOUS REVIEW MODEL
In the base stock policy model, we assumed that all vendors repienished their stock continuously maintaining a fixed inventory level. However, if ordering cost is not insignificant, then maintaining a fixed inventory level by ordering continuously can be an expensive proposition. For such situations, we will formulate a continuous review model where each vendor orders periodically like in the classical EOQ model. However, unlike the classical EOQ model, each vendor has to consider not only the annual ordering and holding costs but also the contribution from the demand that results from the inventory ievel In the model described below we assume a condition of steady state i. e., each vendor i orders the same quantity Q t of the product per order and that the inventory is repienished at periodic intervals when the inventory level reduces to zero.
The principal assumptions of this model are as follows. C. 1 Total annual demand at all vendors is a constant. C.2 Demand rate at vendor i at time t is proportional to vendor f s inventory level relative to the total inventory (at all vendors) at the same time t. C. 3 Each vendor i replenishes his inventory periodically to the same maximum level Q t when the inventory level drops to zero.
C.4 Replenishment is instantaneous. Let s t (t) and Ri(t) dénote vendor i's stock level and demand rate respectively at time t. Then by assumptions C. 1 and C.2, we can conclude that: Without loss of generality, we assume that at time 0, all vendors have repienished their inventories to their respective maximum levels, i. e., S;(0) = 2; for i= 1, . . ., n. Bef ore the next replenishment by any vendor, the inventory level of vendor i at any time t can be described as follows: 
where Q = £ Q r
Before replenishment by any vendor, the demand rate at any vendor as described by équation (4.3) is independent of f, and is given by the demand rate at time 0. Hence, for any vendor i, the stock level decreases linearly with time, Let vendor i be the first vendor to deplete completely his inventory. Then by assumption C. 3, the time T t between replenishments for vendor i is given by ^(7^ = 0, Le., Q i -RQ i T i /Q = 0, i. e.,
T t = Q/R for all i. (4.5)
Note that the time between replenishments T t is independent of f, L e., T t is the same for all vendors. All vendors will replenish their inventories at the same point in time. A graph of the stock levels of the n vendors versus time will be as shown in figure 4.1.
Suppose that vendor f s cost (in dollars) of holding one unit in inventory for one year is denoted by C h t and the fixed cost (L e., independent of the size of the order) in dollars of placing an order is denoted by C o f . Furthermore, let P t dénote vendor f s contribution to profit from selling one unit of the product before taking into account the holding and the ordering costs. Then vendor i's annual net profit is given as follows. Once again we have a n-person non-zero-sum game. Note that if C o ~0 for ail Ï, then this game model reduces essentially to the base stock policy model described in section 3 (the only différence being that the annual holding cost for each vendor in this model is half that of the annual holding cost in the base stock policy model). Hence, we can consider this model as a generalization of the base stock policy model. Our analysis of this model will closely parallel the analysis in the previous section.
First we will compute an upper bound Q t m on the inventory level such that vendor i is certain to incur a loss if he carries more than the upper bound. As bef ore we have P t R = C h i Q i J2 (ignoring ordering cösts), i. e., i for all i (4.7)
0L t represents the frequency of demand necessary to recover the cost of keeping one unit of the product in inventory for one year. Define p £ = C o JPP ; represents the number of units vendor i has to sell to recover his ordering cost per order. As in the last section, we examine the question of the optimal quantity that vendor i should order assuming that the order quantities of all other vendors are known and that these will not change as a resuit of vendor i's décision. The question can be posed as an optimization problem:
The optimal solution to this problem is described in theorem 4.2 below.
THEOREM4.2:
The optimal solution Qf to problem P3 described above is given by
where Ô, = Ôi+ • • Note that this resuit is analogous to that of theorem 3.1 for the base stock policy model. Next, we compute the Nash Equilibrium inventory levels (which are defined as în section 3) for the continuous review model. The resuit is stated in theorem 4. 3. This resuit is similar in many respects to the Nash Equilibrium inventory levels for the base stock policy model. The main différence is the présence of an additional condition (4. 8) on the total demand that arises due to the fact that the vendors have to recover the fixed ordering costs that was not present in the base stock policy model Condition (4. 8) is by no means a very tight condition, i. e., the demand does not necessarily have to be as large as indicated. However, it is certainly sufficient. In any case for most applications, this condition is academie, i. e., we expect that this condition will be easily satisfied.
Comparing with theorem 3.2, expression (4.9) has an additional term e v Note that e t may either be positive or négative. More precisely, for vendor i, if Pj/p>a i /a then e t is positive and if p f /P<a f /a then e t is négative. n Furthermore, £ e/ = 0. Comparing the expression for total inventory g* carried by all vendors with the corresponding expression in theorem 3.2, we note that Q* in this model is more than twice the Q* in the base stock policy model. The factor of 2 is explained by the fact that the annual holding cost component in the objective function of each vendor in the continuous review model is half that of the annual holding cost component in the objective function in the base stock policy model. The fixed ordering cost parameters p/s in the continuous review model explain why Q* is more than twice greater.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In both the models we studied, we assume that the total demand for the product is fixed and independent of the total inventory. In some markets, this may not be valid. It would be interesting to examine the models assuming that total demand is an increasing function of the total inventory. Another possible extension is to examine the compétitive situation as a dynamic, multi-period game. Some work done in industrial économies may be relevant hère. See, for example, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983 Proof of theorem 4.1: It is easy to verify that (4.3) and (4.4) satisfy Systems (4.1) and (4.2).
Q.E.D.
The proof s of theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are analogous to the proof s of theorems 3.1 and 3.2 respectively and are therefore omitted.
